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The 1997 financial crisis created major ripples all across Korean society. The crisis has
meant not only a halt to Korea’s decades-long phenomenal economic growth, but also
its subjection to comprehensive restructuring processes. Controversies and debates over
the cause of the crisis notwithstanding, Korea has undergone profound transforma-
tions, swallowing a bitter pill prescribed by global capitalism in general, and the IMF
in particular. This paper examines the nature of prescription by the IMF and the char-
acteristics of Korean governments in conjunction with the financial crisis. The paper
criticizes the IMF’s imposition of the same ready-made policies to Korea, and character-
izes the Korean governments as ‘a reckless knight to the world’ and ‘a docile student of
the IMF school’. Although much has been written about the financial crisis, especially
on the causes of the crisis and preventive measures, little attention has been paid to its
social and cultural impact. In view of this, this paper discusses how the financial crisis,
ill-suited IMF measures and misguided economic policies of the Korean government
have had far-reaching consequences on Koreans’ worldview and identity, as well as on
social problems, such as the weakening of the weak and destabilizing middle class.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last four decades of the twentieth century, South Korea (hence-
forth Korea) experienced rapid economic growth, leading to its characteriza-
tion as the “Korean miracle”. However, this legacy came to an end in 1997
when the country was gripped by a financial crisis of historic proportions.
The crisis humbled Korea into economic trusteeship under global capital-
ism, in return for bailout loans from the International Monetary Fund
(henceforth IMF). A major part of the trusteeship was the Korean govern-
ment’s agreement to restructure the domestic economy under the auspices
of the IMF, the leading international financial agency championing global
capitalism. The crisis has meant not only a halt to Korea’s decades-long phe-
nomenal economic growth, but also its subjection to comprehensive restruc-
turing processes at the societal level. Controversies and debates over the
causes of the crisis notwithstanding, Korea has undergone profound trans-
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formation, swallowing a bitter pill prescribed by global capitalism in gener-
al and the IMF in particular.
Very few scholars would deny that the last twenty years, spanning from
the 1980s through the 1990s to today, could be named ‘the age of global cap-
italism’. It is almost impossible to open a newspaper today without seeing a
story about globalization and global capitalism. Korean society, having
experienced a grave financial crisis, and in its aftermath the IMF’s economic
intervention, has felt the far-reaching impacts of global capitalism. The IMF,
being a self-appointed agent of global capitalism, not only explicitly advises
that something should be done about economic structure related to the
financial crisis, but also demands implicitly that all social actors must shrug
off the past routines and take up a new way of thought and behavior that is
suitable for the so-called the global standard. 
It is widely recognized that Korea’s remarkable economic growth resulted
in a pathway from the periphery, elevating it to the rank of the eleventh
largest economy in the world, and entry into the OECD in 1996. Right after
the declaration of financial crisis, virtually all socio-economic indicators fell
into a miserable state within a day. For instance, the unemployment rate
more than doubled within the first few months of the crisis, and the per
capita GNP plummeted from over $10,000 in 1996 to approximately $6,000
in 1998, falling to the level achieved in 1991. Negative growth rates, corpo-
rate bankruptcies, paralysis of the banking and financial sector, steep asset
deflation, and pervasive unemployment and homelessness, all of which
were quite foreign to the populace of Korea, became widespread. 
The most striking aspect of the post-financial crisis is that change is not
limited to the economic sphere. Virtually every sector of Korean society,
including corporate, banking, labor unions, government, state-run enter-
prises, politics, education, and even social habits and values have under-
gone and are undergoing significant changes. It is also apparent that there
seems to be a profound sense of urgency to do away with traditional values
and practices that hamper transparency and efficiency1(Kim and Park, 2003:
47). 
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1 The 1997 financial crisis in Korea — and other Asian nations — has drawn attention to
negative aspects of traditional values and practices that heavily hinge on Confucianism. For
example, it has been noted that family loyalty has justified nepotism, while respect for author-
ity has engendered passivity that allowed political and economic leaders to indulge in corrup-
tion. Moreover, reliance on personal networks rather than product competitiveness has even-
tually constrained the growth of firms. Also, reliance on relationships rather than rules in 
business transactions, especially in the banking sector, has also fostered widespread corrup-
tion. 
Although much has been written about the financial crisis, especially on
the causes of the crisis, its economic consequences, and preventive mea-
sures, relatively little attention has been paid to its social and cultural
impact. A major part of this paper focuses on the impact of the financial cri-
sis on identity formation and social inequality. The two consequences, seem-
ingly unrelated to each other, are in fact two different effects of the same
causes, the one being symbolic or cultural and the other material.
Although the statement that the economic crisis easily contributes to the
identity and authority crises in everyday life is widely recognized, rarely
has it been verified with empirical studies. This paper explores the financial
crisis’ consequences for the worldview, identity, and life-style of the Korean
people. This paper also discusses the issue of social inequality, in which col-
lapsing the middle class, in the context of class polarization, is regarded as
one of the most noticeable transformations, in conjunction with the financial
crisis. Further, the paper critically evaluates the IMF’s policies toward the
Korean financial crisis, and the Korean government’s responses to the 1997
financial crisis. 
IMF: READY-MADE PRESCRIPTION
The IMF’s textual prescription for restructuring Korean society was
ready-made, and therefore lacked flexibility and feasibility. When the IMF
provided rescue funds for crisis-stricken Korea, the stipulation was that
macro-economic stabilization policies and restructuring processes should be
undertaken. It was the same stipulation that the IMF had imposed on many
debtor countries all over the world, in order to diffuse the logic of market
oriented neo-liberalism worldwide. The IMF program is now being severely
criticized as the “same old belt-tightening adjustment” or “one-size-fits-all
approach” (Lee and Rhee, 1999).
Different countries receive IMF rescue funds for different reasons, and
under different circumstances. However, the IMF’s prescription is ready-
made and invariably the same. The IMF’s packages of prescriptions, which
were focused on austerity measures, exacerbated the credit crisis that corpo-
rations were already suffering from, triggered a chain reaction of bankrupt-
cy, and drove the economy into recession. Austerity measures, the standard
prescription of the IMF, were indiscriminately applied in the Korean case as
well, although the country showed none of the symptoms typically associat-
ed with the austerity prescription. Unlike the South American countries,
Korea recorded low inflation and a balanced budget. Also the economic fun-
damentals underlying the Korean crisis differed in many respects from the
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crises in Southeast Asian countries, such as Indonesia. 
The crisis in Korea was first and foremost a currency crisis. Korea’s
domestic economic fundamentals before the crisis were actually quite
sound: saving rates were high, the government budget was in balance, GDP
growth was strong, and unemployment was very low (Bank of Korea, 2001;
KDI, 2001). Furthermore, most foreign loans were financing investments in
export sectors rather than speculative asset positions and imports of con-
sumer goods. The currency crisis was mainly caused by the liquidity short-
age, resulting from the excessive borrowing of short-term funds by the
banking and corporate sector. Thus, it was a mismatch between short-term
borrowing and long-term investment. Once liquidity shortage was appar-
ent, a mass move to recover loans and self-fulfilling pessimism overtook the
money market. 
The IMF austerity prescription targeted budget deficit reduction through
raising taxes and cutting government spending, as well as a tighter mone-
tary policy through higher interest rates and less credit availability. The IMF
proposed a set of reforms that comprised three broad elements: a clear and
firm exit policy; strong market and supervisory discipline; and increased
competition. The IMF believed that an effective system of corporate gover-
nance and deregulated capital markets were essential ingredients to ensure
an efficient allocation of resources in the future. However, these short-term
macroeconomic policies in the face of temporary illiquidity rather than fun-
damental insolvency become controversial. The IMF package that the
Koreans were forced to accept at year-end came with the usual fetters. Its
contraction bias made the credit crunch that firms were already facing even
worse, leading to a chain of bankruptcies and possibly driving the economy
toward depression. The IMF’s five percent inflation rate target was already
too strict, given that the economy had to deal with a big rise in import
prices due to devaluation. A common problem with IMF packages is that
nominally set fiscal targets become tighter in real terms than had originally
been foreseen (Feldstein, 1998; Piper and Taylor, 1998: 58). Regardless of the
appropriateness of the IMF’s role, the IMF regime apparently intended to
restructure the entire economic structure and society. The IMF program for
Korea goes well beyond standard IMF programs, calling for structural and
institutional reform, even though they are not needed to resolve the curren-
cy crisis (Wade and Veneroso, 1998: 13). It sought the complete transforma-
tion of the Korean economic structure and the opening of all Korea’s finan-
cial accounts to unrestricted access by foreign multinational corporations,
banks, and financial investors.
In retrospect, the currency crisis might have been contained if Korea’s
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response had been on the mark and timely. Unfortunately, the IMF’s condi-
tions were too harsh and inappropriate for the nature of the crisis. As a
result, the real economy was forced to contract more than was otherwise
necessary, resulting in a surge in the number of business failures and the
unemployed. No doubt the financial austerity policies worked to weed out
inefficient marginal firms, but it is also true that many viable firms were vic-
timized by the impact of these policies. The currency crisis rapidly devel-
oped into a financial crisis that further deteriorated into a full-scale econom-
ic crisis and, then into a social crisis, due to ill-suited IMF measures and the
misguided economic policy of the Korean government (Nam, 1998: 1).
KOREAN GOVERNMENTS: A RECKLESS KNIGHT TO THE WORLD
AND A DOCILE STUDENT OF THE IMF SCHOOL
Without preparing suitable institutional devices required for a transition
to a market economy, the Kim Young Sam (henceforth YS) government
(1993-1998) made hasty attempts to make economic reforms under the slo-
gan of globalization. Due to overwhelming resistance from big businesses,
the Chaebol reform ended in fiasco. Other restructuring programs left much
to be desired, with no proper supportive measures being taken. Only capital
market liberalization was hastily undertaken. It is fair to say that Korea was
not able to adopt necessary reforms in its economy due to resistance from
interest groups, including the Chaebol and other vested interests. In the
name of financial liberalization, the government failed to monitor foreign
borrowing activities, especially by inexperienced merchant banks. This
resulted in a rapid buildup of $150 billion of external debt, with 60 percent
of the obligations having less than one year to maturity, and over 25 percent
maturing in ninety days (Piper and Taylor, 1998: 57-8). 
This indicates that governmental supervision of Korea’s financial institu-
tions was significantly lacking. The Korean government has steadily liberal-
ized its financial market, especially after joining the OECD. However, moni-
toring of foreign borrowing by Korean financial institutions has been inade-
quate (Jung, 1999: 79). As deregulations on capital inflow (which were
unavoidable because of Korea’s joining OECD) made it easier for domestic
financial institutions to borrow foreign funds, the domestic financial system
was exposed to the inherent vicissitudes of international financial markets.
Nevertheless, regulatory and monitoring devices became even looser. The
crisis was caused by regulatory forbearance and the subsequent weakening
of control over the liberalized financial market in the 1990s (Haggard, 2000:
138; Cho, 2003: 258-262). All these circumstances meant that domestic finan-
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cial institutions tended to be more vulnerable to liquidity crisis. It can also
be pointed out that necessary structural reforms were not implemented
expeditiously enough by the government to forestall the impending crisis. 
In a nutshell, the YS government decided to join the OECD, while it did
not devise any institutional measures in preparation for the unfettered
inflow of international capital that was an unavoidable corollary of becom-
ing a member of the OECD. In this sense, we can characterize the YS gov-
ernment’s globalization measures as ‘enthusiastic propaganda globaliza-
tion’. 
Economic restructuring in the post-financial crisis period has been a
process of accommodating global capitalism, in which especially the
American version of global capitalism has invariably served as the model.
The restructuring process that the Kim Dae Jung (henceforth DJ) govern-
ment (1998-2003) persistently undertook can be said to be the process of
overcoming economic crisis through neo-liberal transformation of Korean
society; that is to say, it has been a process of exploring the possibility of a
stable marriage with global capitalism. This position is supported by the
argument that the DJ government has complied with almost all programs
that the IMF recommended as if it were a docile student of the IMF school.
The government has been more eager to get closer to the American style of
economic management than any other Korean governments have ever been. 
The DJ government declared the principle of democratic market economy,
or parallel development of democracy and market economy as the theoreti-
cal foundation of its economic policies. However, as a practical guidance for
specific policy formulation and implementation plans, it is severely unreal-
istic and lacks viability. The principle of democratic market economy aims
to redress unfair economic policies and practices, and to form a healthy
market economy in which fair rule of free competition reigns. That is all; the
principle does not go any further. Ideologically, this principle embraces the
value of democratic market economy based on order-liberalism. However,
under the influence of IMF intervention, it seems structurally impossible to
escape from neo-liberalism. Also, restructuring of the DJ government can be
characterized as ‘enforced restructuring’, since it followed neo-liberal
restructuring processes under the condition of external coercion.
Of course, the neo-liberalism of the DJ government cannot be totally
ascribed to some external pressure like the IMF’s prescription. The fact is
that the concrete demands that the government made are, more often than
not, much more liberalistic than the abstract guidelines the IMF has recom-
mended. In terms of economic reform or restructuring, the policy keynote of
the DJ government was in continuum with that of the YS government.
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Though the two governments are chronologically separated, one coming to
power before the IMF control and the other after, both share the same
keynote of policy-making, i.e., neo-liberalism. 
The economic change of the Korean society was nothing more than a
transformation process to a new economic structure centered on interna-
tional capital. It aimed at opening up all markets in Korea so that foreign
corporations, banks, and investors could more easily purchase Korean insti-
tutions. Legal barriers that had hindered the take-over of Korean firms by
foreigners were repealed. More importantly, the IMF was now demanding
obliteration of all remaining barriers in the flow of international capital. If
this demand was satisfied, foreigners could invest in Korean financial mar-
kets with the same status as Koreans. Specifically, if policy control over the
ultra-short-term speculative fund, so-called hot-money, was also repealed,
then the Korean institutions would become more at risk of foreign
takeovers. If each and every regulation on capital mobility was totally abol-
ished, then all forms of international capital, including hot-money, would be
literally free to come into and go out of Korea. It is generally agreed that if
Korean markets were completely opened, stability and autonomy of the
Korean economy would be totally dependent on the credit ratings deter-
mined by speculative foreign capital. The Korean economy would then be
helplessly exposed to another foreign exchange crisis. 
The question then remains, ‘why did the Korean government accept such
a demand?’ That the Korean government, desperately seeking foreign capi-
tal in order to get out of the crisis on hand, had no choice might be an
answer. However, the problem is that injection of foreign capital continued
well beyond the level necessary to bail out a cash-strapped government.
Chaebols viewed the IMF as leverage for getting what they wanted from
labor unions and the government. They believed that they could take
advantage of the IMF in order to acquire significant accessions from labor
unions, and to shrug off cumbersome government regulations, including
restrictions on overseas borrowing. Planting a neo-liberal structure into a
non neo-liberal country could be facilitated by the benefits that domestic
corporations came to acquire from the emergence of a neo-liberal global
economy (Crotty et al., 1998: 136-7). Indeed, it is obvious that capital will
gain absolute advantage over labor. Viewed from this perspective, the
restructuring process in Korean society can be characterized as a process
through which a short history of balance of power between capital and
labor has finally come to an end, and capital began to obtain the upper
hand. The IMF’s structural adjustment process during the financial crisis
period can be summarized as a process of capital’s gaining absolute advan-
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tage vis-à-vis labor at the high point of capital-labor confrontation. As a
result, labor issues lose flexibility.
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Reconstruction of Identity: Dualistic Directions 
The financial crisis and its subsequent restructuring have created major
ripples all across Korean society. In particular, there was a noticeable change
in identity. The financial crisis is not only an economic problem, like intro-
duction of a new market mechanism and labor-capital conflict, but also
more significantly, a cultural problem — the problem of defining identity, of
how to redefine the concept of ‘we’. In a survey, the following question was
delivered to a sample of university students: “What do you think is the
most harmful effect of globalization on Korean society?” 36.6 percent of the
respondents cited loss of cultural identity as the answer, 31.5 percent cited
instability of employment, and 16 percent cited concentration of wealth (The
Yonsei Annals, 2001). The survey indicated that the loss of identity crisis is
regarded as the most important in the age of globalization. 
Identity is very important for a society to achieve and maintain an ade-
quate level of social cohesiveness and integration. Experiencing an econom-
ic crisis, in conjunction with globalization whose inherent feature is instabil-
ity, the question of how the self-identity of the Korean people is constructed
and reconstructed is an important topic. Before the crisis, Koreans shared
many common ideas, including conventional ways of doing business,
expectations of life-time employment, trust in business culture, beliefs about
the nation’s international status and prospect, and above all, pride in being
Korean, all of which contributed to the expansion of the collective con-
sciousness of the Korean people, in Durkheimian terms. The financial crisis
required that Koreans discard everything they had if it lacked competitive-
ness. Under this circumstance, it might be natural that the meaning of ‘we’
becomes vague. Trust in social relations that has been ascribed to ‘us’ or ‘we
Korean’ is now being rapidly undermined.
According to an international comparative study conducted from
September to October in 1997, just before the crisis, national solidarity
among Korean people was at a much higher level than for Americans,
British, Germans, Italians, and Japanese. Koreans recorded very high ratings
on the item that “my country’s prosperity is my prosperity” (The Public
Information Bureau, 1997). However, nowadays we can easily witness a
tremendous decline in Korean self-identity. 
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Koreans’ identity was established through the economic modernization
process that shaped Korean society in the last half of the twentieth century.
Nationalism undoubtedly played a major part in the economic moderniza-
tion of Korea. Nationalism, when articulated in association with industrial-
ization and modernization, is an ideological source of massive mobilization.
Equating economic modernization with national aspiration had galvanized
people to commit themselves to Korea. Modernization in Korea was under-
taken through the expression of homogeneous national identity and nation-
alism (Kim and Park, 2003: 39-44).
The most conspicuous feature of Korean identity is the absolute sense of
homogeneity that is generated by the overwhelming strength of national
identity. Though there have been many changes recently, still it is true that
Koreans take the three separate entities — state, society, and nation — as
one and the same, as if they were a homogeneous organism which has its
own life. Actually, national identity and nationalism served in the process of
industrial modernization as a spur which stimulated Korean people to work
harder. In pursuing modernization, national identity played the role of a
catalyst for mobilizing complete compliance from the people. While Korean
identity, characterized by uniformity and homogeneity which are byprod-
ucts of powerful national identity, is seemingly strong enough, it is, para-
doxically, very susceptible to external shocks. Identity that has been formed
by pressures of national sameness turns fragile when it is hit by a blow from
outside. 
Therefore, demands of globalization and experience of the IMF interven-
tion can easily contribute to an identity crisis. Koreans, who were equipped
with an identity of homogeneity and uniformity that formed when the
experiences of democracy were meager and the pressures to conformity
were so strong, now suffer from severe identity crisis, having lost sets of
meanings ascribed to them. They often show multiple and inconsistent
responses to the same situation. For example, even though they have been
feeling embarrassed at being Koreans, they easily become, whether at an
individual or collective level, proud of being a Korean and make up their
minds to do their best as a Korean when they are exposed to slogans arous-
ing national identity such as “You Koreans, Get On Your Feet and Run
Again!” (Chung, 2000: 16).
Financial crisis and the ensuing period of the IMF intervention were, in
the middle of the tide of globalization, the very hotbed of identity loss for
the Korean people. The loss of identity stemmed from the loss of status as a
social existence. Social problems and deviations, which steeply increased
after the crisis, are symptoms of anomic chaos and identity loss, which sig-
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nifies that our established modes of life are losing their meanings.
According to a survey, the pain index of Korean people increased from 1.5
in 1997 to 20.9 in 1998, which means that after the crisis Koreans suffered
from fourteen times as much pain as they did before the crisis (Jungang Il
Bo, 1998. 11. 10). 
Under the crisis and IMF trusteeship, responses of Korean people to
national identity were broadly divided between two directions, the one
involving sticking to a nationalistic mentality ever more faithfully, the other
dismissing the nationalist conceptions altogether. Most immediate respons-
es were to appeal to ethnic nationalism and patriotism. This is supported by
the fact that Korean people labeled the day of December 5, 1997 as the day
of national infamy because it was on that day that the memorandum to pro-
vide fifty-five billion dollars of urgent rescue fund was signed between the
IMF and the Korean government. Also, the Korean people thought that after
the day of infamy, Korea was put under an IMF trusteeship just as it had
been put under Japanese trusteeship about a century ago. Various move-
ments were resorted to in order to mobilize national identity. Through mass
media, people were encouraged to collect gold2 and dollars, and to refrain
from purchasing foreign liquors, foreign cigarettes, and even coffee. “Inde-
pendent Coke 815” was the brand of a newly marketed domestic product
named after August 15th, the Korean Independence Day, to get the upper
hand over famous foreign brands, such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi. In a similar
vein, the Hangul & Computer Company, having narrowly escaped being
taken over by Microsoft, with the help of a nationwide donation campaign,
made a new version of Hangul named “Version 815”. These are among typi-
cal cases where the politics of identity were employed. 
On the other hand, there were undeniable tendencies to escape from the
influences of nationalist conceptions. Attitudes toward emigration, promo-
tion of English as another official language, and attraction of foreign capital
became affirmative. Emigration increased persistently from 1962, the year
when the emigration act was first legislated, to 1980, when a total of 37,510
Koreans migrated to foreign countries. However, the opposite trend had set
in from 1981 onward, reaching a record low of 12,484 emigrants in 1997.
After 1997, emigration increased again. This time, it is characteristic that the
proportion of emigrants who left Korea by invitation of their relatives
abroad has declined drastically, while the rate of business-or-employment-
related emigration has increased. A survey in 2001 indicated that 45.3 per-
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2 Called “Save the nation” drive, it raised 225 tons of gold in a couple of months, out of
which 196.3 tons were exported, bringing in $1.82 billion in badly needed hard currency
(Korea Herald, 1998. 3. 16). 
cent of Koreans would consider immigration if they had that option (Dong-
A Il Bo, 2001. 4. 4). In the mean time, the number of return-emigrants, hav-
ing increased steeply from 1980 to 1997, slowed down in 1998. Moreover,
considering that the emigration of those with more money and professional
expertise increased during the crisis, we can conclude that the recent
increase in the number of emigrants cannot be explained by economic fac-
tors only, and is closely tied to the change in national identity. 
Another indicator reflecting that some change has been occurring in
Korean national identity can be found in the controversy over whether
English should be made another official language. According to a survey,
56.7 percent of Korean people replied “yes” to the question of English as
another official language, while the percentage of the opponents was 39.3
percent (Dong-A Il Bo, 2000. 10. 31). This result suggests that Korean nation-
al identity has been weakened.
The financial crisis was a rude awakening, prompting Koreans to reflect
on their values, worldviews, and the overall Korean life-style. It was dis-
heartening that their prized ways, at least in the economic sphere, proved to
be inefficient and to a certain extent, even irrational. The controversy over
Asian values is a case in point. Koreans have long prided themselves on
having embraced Asian values - i.e., deference to societal or group interests,
emphasis on self-cultivation and education, respect for probity and loyalty,
emphasis on social harmony, respect for authority and consensus over con-
frontation. They believed in their superiority over western individualism in
achieving rapid industrialization and sustained economic growth. However,
the financial crisis highlighted the dark side of these cherished values. The
question of what is national can no longer serve as a criterion for distin-
guishing between the good and the bad, between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The belief
that Korean identity is Korean nationality and vice-versa has gradually been
diluted. Koreans are growing out of the old identity based on the concept of
‘we’. 
According to Durkheim, the weakening of collective consciousness and
ensuing identity crisis triggers a series of reactions on the part of the group
members. By highlighting the commonality or sameness within the group
through various means (which Durkheim referred to as boundary redefini-
tion), the group seeks to strengthen the collective consciousness among
members, and thereby to redress the identity crisis. The boundary crisis and
boundary redefinition go hand in hand in a period of weakened collective
consciousness and identity crisis. Dualism in the Korean identity problem in
which the episodes of ‘the politics of nationalism’ is posed against the
counter example of the withering away of Korean national identity can be
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explained by resorting to the Durkheimian conceptions about boundary cri-
sis and boundary redefinition. The dualistic reconstruction of Korean identi-
ty crisis can be characterized as a manifestation of the weakening of the
Korean people’s collective consciousness and the simultaneous efforts of
Korean society to overcome the identity crisis by emphasizing the similari-
ties most Koreans share.
Weakening of the Weak and Destabilizing Middle Class
Since the financial crisis, very unstable circumstances are prevalent in
Korean society, where everybody runs the risk of being unemployed or
being demoted to non-regular jobs. The crisis is worse because the social
safety net was hardly established in this society. While unemployment and
low job-security became facts of life, the safety net was too precarious to
meet the increased welfare demand. The weakening of the weak becomes
more evident when we consider dwindling of the state capabilities. The
state capabilities dwindle not only due to the state’s inability to escape from
the external pressures of neo-liberalism, but also due to the lack of material
economic foundations necessary for a new integrative restructuring. Indeed,
restructuring efforts without a sufficient material basis are bound to trigger
a wave of conflicts among various social groups. 
Neo-liberal economic restructuring policy, with the free-operating market
mechanism at its core, leads to polarization of class structure, magnifying
current inequalities among social strata and occasioning the collapse of mid-
dle classes and the emergence of a new poverty class. On the other hand,
central issues of strikes by labor unions are almost always defensive ones
such as avoidance of lay-off and unemployment. The gap between the rich
and the poor has widened, urban middle-class households are falling into
desperate situations, and lower-income classes depend on debts for daily
livelihood. These conditions reflect the severity of ongoing social disintegra-
tion. Under these circumstances, labor issues become less and less flexible,
although maintaining labor flexibility is the top-priority policy objective. 
Instability of employment and unemployment are at the core of the social
crisis. Korean society has been immersed in sustained growth for so long
that it did not prepare itself for, nor even anticipate the possibility of mas-
sive unemployment. An enduring unemployment rate of approximately 2
percent seemed to free Korean society from the risk of an unemployment
crisis. Lifetime employment or lifelong job security has been the norm sym-
bolizing the Korean employment system. After this unemployment-free
period, the unemployment rate skyrocketed to around 8 percent, and a
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record number of unemployed amounted to 1.8 million in early 1998. The
impact was profound. The monthly average real income per urban house-
hold recorded a 20 percent decrease in the third quarter of 1998 from a year
ago. In addition to the sharp decline in income level, income distribution
has deteriorated at significant depth and speed. The Gini-coefficient drasti-
cally rose to 0.3222 in the third quarter of 1998 from 0.3005 in the same peri-
od of the previous year (Moon, et al., 1999: 38).
Under the pressure of enforced adjustments, the labor market began to be
extorted. Also, extorted patterns of unemployment became fixed. The pro-
portion of involuntary unemployment steeply increased from 35.7 percent
in 1997 to 80.1 percent in the first quarter of 1998. Although it gradually
decreased after that, it is still higher compared to that of average years
(Ministry of Labor, 2001). The representative forms of involuntary unem-
ployment included unemployment of the youth and long-term unemploy-
ment. Unemployment of youth, aged 15 to 29, became a severe social prob-
lem; the unemployment rate among young people is twice as high as that of
the total population. Unemployment of the youth can no longer be regarded
as unemployment of cyclical patterns. It begins to reflect the pattern of
structural unemployment. The proportion of youth unemployment
increased even after 1999, when the economy slowly began to move into the
phase of recovery. 
Long-term unemployment also increased both absolutely and relatively.
Of the total unemployed people, the proportion of those who have been
unemployed for more than one year is getting higher. In 1996, before the cri-
sis, it was 4.2 percent, but it increased to the average of 15.3 percent from
1998 to June of 2000. Duration of unemployment has been systematically
extended. Above that, the proportion of the re-unemployed, those who had
ever been employed before they became unemployed, was around 50%
before the crisis, and increased to the average of 92.5 percent thereafter
(Bureau of Statistics, 2001). That means it becomes more difficult to get
another job after losing one. 
The percentage of non-regular job workers also increased greatly. The
new structure of the labor market that was created by neo-liberal restructur-
ing processes is consolidating the expansion of non-regular jobs and, as a
result, the gaps between regular and non-regular jobs are becoming more
serious. The fact that in 1999, 92 percent of the newly employed workers got
non-regular jobs emphatically shows that the Korean labor market is under-
going the process of dual-structuration, which will radically divide the
labor market into two sub-sectors. Recent research shows that there are
7,580 non-regular job workers, 58.4 percent of the entire wageworkers.
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Nevertheless, the workload of non-regular job workers is heavier than that
of regular job workers. The former works an average of 47.5 hours weekly,
whereas the latter works 47.1 hours. Acts of discrimination against non-reg-
ular jobholders are also found in the areas of social insurance and labor con-
ditions. Among regular jobholders, the percentage of those who took out
major social insurances, including a national pension fund, workplace med-
ical insurance, and employment insurance, ranges from 74 to 94 percent,
while it hardly exceeds 20 percent among non-regular job workers (Bureau
of Statistics, 2001).
The basic objective of the government’s unemployment policy is first to
conclude restructuring quickly and successfully, and then to promote com-
petitiveness of firms, and finally to create new jobs. It is modeled after
unemployment policies of the United States and the United Kingdom,
which attempt to create jobs by strengthening corporate competitiveness
with market-oriented economic policies, while keeping the labor market as
flexible as possible. If the Korean government keeps on pursuing this kind
of unemployment policy, Korean society will invariably wind up with a
society of long-term structural unemployment, as was witnessed in Europe.
However, in Korea, the social safety net is not as well-equipped. The Korean
government is now rushing head-on toward western-style unemployment
policies without a western-style safety net. Korean society is in a situation in
which serious unemployment is imminent, but the safety net is not well-
developed. The Korean labor market makes the cleavages ever more crystal-
lized between the employed and the unemployed, and between regular and
non-regular jobs, accelerating the weakening of the weak in Korean society.
A polarized society is threatening to become a stark reality in Korea.
In the mean time, the noticeable decline of middle class identification was
observed in conjunction with the financial crisis. Over the past several
decades, since the mid 1960s, Korea’s middle class has rapidly expanded
with the country’s successful industrialization and economic growth.
During the 1980s and 1990s, Korea’s economic growth significantly resulted
in the spread of middle class habits and life-styles throughout the country;
even blue-collar workers assumed a middle class consciousness. Roughly
speaking, Koreans began to take the values and life-style of the middle class
as a yardstick for social order. It is a widely accepted argument that the mid-
dle class is inclined to favor a multicultural society, where a diversity of val-
ues and ideologies coexist, and where one can attain one’s goals through
education and the burning passion to climb the social ladder. The middle
class tends to value equal opportunity more than other classes. The middle
class also relatively champions fair competition. It expects to enjoy greater
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civil rights and political freedom, stressing the role of the state in supra-par-
tisan and national mediation. Therefore, an upswing of the middle class is a
sign of social change toward greater economic growth, democracy, and
social integration (Park, 1998). A comparative survey in 1998 demonstrates
a marked decline in the number of respondents who identified themselves
as belonging to the middle class (Table 1). Fear is now growing that this
social order embedded in the middle class may be collapsing in Korea
today.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: TOWARDS SOCIAL INTEGRATION 
The financial crisis has had wide-ranging impact on Korean society, out of
which insecure jobs and employment, widening economic inequality, dual-
istic features of nationalism, and new ways of identity formation have been
most noticeable. The financial crisis and its subsequent impact could have
triggered an excellent opportunity for Korea to overhaul the social rationali-
ty of Korean society. Furthermore, the idea that there is indeed a gigantic
change in the world, so called relentless globalization, is gaining momen-
tum in Korea. 
As neo-liberal restructuring leads to the deconstructive change of Korean
society, various actors involved in the ensuing conflicts become entwined
with each other. During the IMF intervention, state capabilities have greatly
weakened. The weakening of state capabilities was occasioned not only by
the inability to escape from the external pressures of neo-liberalism, but also
by lack of material economic foundations necessary for a new integrative
restructuring. Indeed, restructuring efforts without a sufficient material
basis are bound to cause conflicts among various social forces, and as a
corollary, disintegration of the social fabric will surely be accelerated. 
The situation is now very serious. The public sector restructuring has yet
to be started, corporate restructuring leaves much to be desired, and moral
hazards are rampant in some public corporations and workout firms.
Corporate profitability continues to decline. Labor unions, faced with the
possibility of lay-offs, are prepared to wage an all-out war against the tor-
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TABLE 1. SELF-IDENTIFICATION OF CLASS MEMBERSHIP
Upper Class Middle Class Low Class
Before the Crisis 4.3 61.1 34.3
After the Crisis 0.6 45.1 54
Source: Hankyoreh, 1999. 4. 13. 
rent of restructuring. Chances of a labor-capital compromise are meager.
Tensions among various social sectors and forces are unprecedentedly high.
This is the very situation where contentious implementation is badly need-
ed. 
How then can the foundation of social integration be constructed? First of
all, a balanced tension among the state, the market, and civil society is
urgently required. Amid the high-water of neo-liberalism, the state has no
choice but to go slim and defensive. Unlike in the past, it is under too many
restrictions to take responsibility for pursuing the common good or promot-
ing public interests. Here, a redefinition of the nature of civil society is need-
ed. We should regard civil society not as a counterforce against the state, a
conception that was formulated in the age of modernity, but as a partner
collaborating with the state to promote public interests, and especially to
coordinate the conflicts caused by the processes of deconstructive restruc-
turing. From this perspective, the state-civil society relation should be con-
sidered as that of balanced tension. In particular, considering that there can
be no such society as propagated by neo-liberalism, we need a new political
project of state-civil society relations. 
Also, we must form certain kinds of counter forces against the one-sided
intrusion of global capitalism. Nowadays, the internal forces that counter-
vail the external threat of global capitalism are very fragile. The spread of
global capitalism is irrevocable. However, its scope and speed must surely
be kept under control, as any other processes of social development should
be. In the past, the right to control or the right to refuse to control belonged
in part to government officials in the economy-related departments, which
was common within the framework of the developmental state. However, a
forceful about-face towards neo-liberalism made these ‘controllers of the
last resort’ helpless, leading to a state of anarchy in countervailing neo-liber-
al policies. Now, the active role of social associations and/or civil society
could have never been more important. 
Korea is one of the typical contemporary cases of not only practicing mas-
sive globalization, but also of confronting anti-globalization. Undeniably,
demands for globalization contain justifiable components. However, these
demands would be more justifiable if uniformity and conformity were less
emphasized and diversity and variety more encouraged. The global village
will be the place where bilateral, multilateral, and multi-dimensional com-
munication will take place. It will not be the world of uniformity in which
unilateral isomorphism and enforced conformity will prevail. 
Globalization has been generating economic growth on the basis of pow-
erful and global driving-forces. The problem is that the economic growth
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thus generated is unable to induce social integration. This means that we
must go beyond the efficiency-first models of development towards an
employment-first model. It would be difficult to stop the identity crisis
brought about by deconstructive social crisis and the weakening of the
weak, in so far as neo-liberal policies are held. Moderated and managed
globalization, as an alternative to the current forms of neo-liberal globaliza-
tion, is required to accomplish a new form of restructuring conducive to
social harmony, stability, and integration in Korean society today. 
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